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Staging democracy: Kenya’s televised presidential debates
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aDepartment of History, University of Durham, Durham, UK; bBritish Institute in Eastern Africa,
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(Received 18 September 2013; accepted 20 November 2013)
Kenyan election campaigning took a novel turn in 2013 with the introduction of
televised presidential debates. The two debates were widely celebrated as signalling a
positive turn in Kenyan campaigning, from the politics of personality and ethnicity
towards a more sober, issue-based form of electoral competition. Organised by the
nation’s main media houses, the debates offer a unique lens through which to consider
the role the media defined for itself during the election period. This paper argues that
the debates were staged as part of the media’s broader project of ‘peace promotion’. In
this way, actual debate between the candidates was of secondary importance to the
spectacle of having all eight candidates amicably share the debate floor. This paper’s
approach thus emphasises the theatrical nature of the performances and the deliberate
way in which they were designed to present a portrait of Kenya’s maturing democracy.
The paper concludes by situating these media spectacles within what is perceived to
be a broader trend in Kenya whereby seductive images of the nation’s future are
produced and projected, thereby distracting from present realities.
Keywords: Kenya; spectacle; elections; televised debates; democracy; media; politics
Under the glare of studio lights, the eight candidates seeking the Kenyan presidency
stood uncertainly as the national anthem was performed during the opening minutes of
the country’s first televised presidential debate. Behind them hung banners of State House
bathed in red, blue and white: the colours of foreign democracies. In front of them a small
audience composed largely of campaign teams, family members, civil society represen-
tatives and media personalities stared back at them.1 For the first time all those aspiring
for the Kenyan presidency were sharing a stage and facing questions on issues ostensibly
of concern to the average voter, ranging from their plans for the country’s education and
healthcare systems to their views on the role of ethnicity in politics and the ongoing
International Criminal Court (ICC) process. Two weeks later they reconvened to tackle a
second batch of subjects, which included corruption, poverty and the issue of land.
The two debates – held on 11 and 25 February 2013 – were hailed as a ‘positive
milestone’ that had the potential to inaugurate a new kind of political competition in a
nation that only five years previously had witnessed electoral violence on a devastating
scale.2 Wholly a media-driven affair, the events were highly publicised and widely
distributed via eight television and 34 radio stations.3 They attracted a substantial audience,
with a small poll conducted by Ipsos Synovate after the first debate finding that 78% of
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those sampled had been exposed to the programme, of which 66% had watched it on
television.4
Taking the debates as our objects of study, we seek to describe the programmes
themselves; to detail the planning that went into them and to explore the underlying logic
motivating the media’s attempts to stage debates for the first time. Whilst fully
acknowledging the power – and limits – of mass media to influence public opinion, we
do not attempt here to evaluate if and how the debates impacted on the eventual electoral
outcome. Instead, we focus on the production of these events, emphasising their theatrical
nature. Connecting this performative approach with broader questions surrounding the
role of the media in post-conflict elections, we suggest that the debates were staged with a
number of objectives in mind; and that the organisers’ stated desire to foster the
emergence of issue-based politics sat uneasily alongside other, less clearly stated
motivations. Specifically, we contend that the media sought to use the debates to
promote peace by creating a spectacle of elite friendship and mutual respect. The debates
were also designed as a medium through which Kenya’s evolving democracy was
signified and celebrated, and as a highly visible way of demonstrating – to multiple
audiences – how far the country had come since the events of 2007/08. We thus see the
debates as ‘media spectacles’, designed more to impress than to inform the nation’s
electorate. Indeed, throughout the article we aim to show that actual debate between
candidates was of secondary importance to the broader image being portrayed on screen.
Elections and the media
Across the world, election periods present distinct challenges to the journalists who cover
them.5 Yet as Marie-Soleil Frère’s analysis of the media’s role in recent elections in six
central African countries shows, these challenges are particularly acute in countries
recovering from traumatic periods of violence and instability. Reporters working in these
fragile political contexts often have to manage sensitively a range of tensions and fears
that can be invoked among citizens by electoral competition. With voters participating in
an act of ‘collective reflection which can turn into a confrontation’,6 journalists have to be
especially alive to the potential impact of their reporting. Standard journalistic codes and
norms can prove difficult to apply, and in the countries examined by Frère, media
operatives were often confronted with a series of dilemmas concerning the role they
should play. Should, for example, electoral malpractice be reported, even if doing so
threatens the broader peace?
The media landscape in Kenya is starkly different from those of the central African
countries examined by Frère. A number of formidable media houses exist in Kenya,
which are privately owned and have print, television, radio and online outputs. The
various outlets are thought by many in the public to be under the influence of competing
political and business interests.7 Yet still the media is frequently ranked as one of the
most trusted public institutions in Kenya.8 Whilst criticism of the media and the role it
played in fuelling the violence after elections in 2007 has mainly been levelled against
vernacular radio stations, mainstream media nonetheless ‘failed to prevent the dissem-
ination of party propaganda and the violent rhetoric of many political leaders’.9 In light of
this, the run up to the 2013 elections saw key players in the media community think
carefully about their role in securing peaceful polls.10 Whilst such reflexivity was not
wholly absent in 2007/08, as Florence Brisset-Foucault has discussed,11 the nature of
2013 as a ‘post-conflict’ election undoubtedly raised the stakes for all concerned.
Journal of Eastern African Studies 79
In the months since the election there has been some debate as to whether media
outlets lived up to the task professional norms demanded of them. One of the most
contentious issues has concerned the media’s decision to self-censor in the interests of
keeping the peace. By not, for example, reporting speeches made by members of the
campaign teams during the vote-count, were the television networks failing to fulfil their
primary purpose? Similarly, criticism has been levelled against the media for their
apparent reluctance to ask probing questions of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission (IEBC) during the lengthy vote tallying and transmission process. Michela
Wrong describes the somewhat farcical situation of the IEBC chairman congratulating the
media for their ‘exemplary behaviour’ whilst a vote-tallying screen above his head
continued to display ‘figures that did not add up’.12 In not probing these discrepancies,
was the media abdicating its basic responsibilities?
Analyses of the role the media played during the elections have thus tended to focus
mainly on the decision-making process in a relatively direct manner. Whilst questions
have been raised about what one columnist has described as a culture of ‘peace
evangelism’,13 these have tended to manifest themselves in discussions of what exactly
should have been reported, and when. The issue at stake has effectively been whether, in
its efforts to promote peaceful polls, the media abdicated from its customary watchdog
role by censoring its output, as indeed it did in 2007/08.14 The presidential debates have
not featured heavily in commentary around this issue. Instead, the media groups
responsible for organising them have constructed a narrative which focuses largely on
the debates’ potential to usher in a new form of politics. The debates, it has widely been
argued, represent a crucial stage in the movement away from the politics of ethnicity and
personality, towards a form of issue-based politics.15 John Githongo talked of them being
‘beamed across the planet much to our pride’,16 whilst British print and online newspaper
The Guardian acclaimed them for providing Kenyans with a rare ‘chance to judge their
prospective leaders on their words and policies rather than on who they are’.17
Media spectacles
We do not wholly reject these positive presentations of the debates. At the very least, in
providing journalists with the opportunity to extract – live on television – commitments
from candidates on a range of issues, the debates might make it easier for politicians to be
held to account for their campaign promises.18 We do however argue that the debates
demand further critical attention. Indeed it is our contention that they provide a unique
window into key media organisations’ mindsets, and to their conception of their role in
the run-up to the elections. In this way, connections between cultural production and the
nation’s broader political-economy should not go unexplored. We find Douglas Kellner’s
concept of media spectacles useful in this regard, these he defines as:
Media constructs that are out of the ordinary and outside habitual daily routine. … They
involve an aesthetic dimension and are often dramatic, bound up with competition. … They
are highly public social events, often taking a ritualistic form to celebrate society’s highest
values.19
Drawing on Kellner’s analytical framework, we see the debates as media-constructed
performances which were meticulously staged and, to a lesser extent, scripted. The
candidates’ movements were carefully choreographed, from their arrivals at the venue, to
their entrances on stage, their handshakes, and ultimately to the post-debate mingle between
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candidates and their families.20 Similarly, the physical staging of the event itself was loaded
with symbolism, most obviously with the aforementioned images of State House and the
red, white and blue colour scheme. An introductory video contained dramatic images of
Kenyan landscapes, interspersed with clips of citizens queuing to vote in past elections.
Such devices underline the fact that the debates were, first and foremost, designed for
television consumption. Much of their power would have been lost to radio listeners not
experiencing this aesthetic assault, which we see as pivotal to the productions.
In treating the debates as media spectacles, we recognise that our work stands apart
from much academic analysis of political debates. American presidential debates in
particular have been intensively studied, particularly by scholars in the fields of
communication and media studies. Yet the bulk of this scholarship is concerned with
either the content of the debates themselves, particularly the language used by the
presidential aspirants,21 or with the relationship between candidates’ performance and
electoral outcomes.22 Whilst there would clearly be value in applying these approaches to
the Kenyan debates,23 this article focuses more on the style than the substance of the
debates. This in part reflects the media’s own objectives in staging the debates. It was in
many respects enough for the events simply to go ahead – for the candidates to share a
stage, and just as importantly to be seen to share a stage – as it was for genuine debate to
occur.
That the organisers intended to transmit a particular message about Kenyan politics
and the impending polls to those watching is clear from the press coverage provided by
the very same media houses that organised them. On the day of the first debate, an article
in The Standard not only prepared audiences for the spectacle ahead but also deciphered
its potential meaning as well:
It would be refreshing to see Mr Raila Odinga and Mr Uhuru Kenyatta give each other a bear
hug. If the two can do that, what would stop a Kikuyu and a Luo embracing each other and
treating the political rhetoric as just that, not a life-long enmity?24
Whilst Kenyatta and Odinga did not quite deliver a ‘bear hug’, the handshakes and
repeated references to ‘my honourable brother’ went some way in providing the spectacle
of friendship and respect intended by the organisers. By adopting the desired language
and behaviour, the leading candidates displayed an awareness of the ritualised nature of
the debate form, and of their participation in a media spectacle. This is not to present
the candidates as merely passive participants; they naturally sought to capitalise on the
opportunities provided by the debates. In speaking of his ‘personal challenges’ at the
ICC, for instance, Kenyatta attempted to remake his world into one where he – like all
politicians – had a private life that had no bearing on his capacity to lead the country.
A media-driven initiative
Supporting the media and promoting responsible journalism is one area in which non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), donors and international organisations try to intervene
constructively in post-conflict elections.25 In her discussion of several political debate
shows aired ahead of Kenya’s 2007 elections, Brisset-Foucault details the involvement of
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Media Development in Africa
(MEDEVA),26 who provided financial backing and guidance on editorial content and
style.27 In 2013, the presidential debates listed Uwaino, a UNDP-backed platform that seeks
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to harness the media in pursuit of peaceful elections as one of its associates, along with
the IEBC.
However, the networks tried to ensure that the debates were presented as wholly
media driven. They thus minimised the involvement of donors and politicians in the
planning process, as both of these stakeholders risked damaging the credibility of the
debates. Instead, the country’s three leading media houses – Royal Media Services
(RMS), the Nation Media Group and the Standard Group – came together to form a
united front from which to promote the debates agenda and to enlist the support of all
presidential aspirants.28 It needs emphasising that these media houses are direct
competitors who are also popularly believed to favour certain political factions. The
debates thus represent a significant collaboration undertaken in the name of the national
interest.
Negotiations, both between the media houses and with the candidates, were lengthy
and took place at the highest levels, with the chief executive officers (CEOs) of the three
companies enlisted to the cause.29 RMS’s Managing Director, Wachira Waruru, chaired
the debates’ steering committee, whilst the CEO of the Nation Group, Linus Kaikai, made
the original announcement that the debates would happen.30 In a striking example of the
media pushing the debates agenda forward, one campaign advisor claimed that newspaper
adverts for the events were published before a firm agreement had been reached with all
the candidates. Those who had previously been reluctant to commit were left with little
choice but to participate.31 These negotiations were not without conflict. Early plans to
hold debates stalled after the candidates were officially announced.32 The questions of
how many and which candidates should be included divided organisers and campaign
teams. The frontrunners preferred fewer candidates, selected on the basis of polling data,
whilst organisers pushed for more candidates,33 arguably to dilute the conflict on-stage.
The last minute court-ordered inclusion of Paul Muite and Mohammed Dida further
exemplifies how contested and coveted the debate platform was,34 which offered –
especially the minor candidates – free and unparalleled publicity.
The one significant exception to this narrative of media dominance came in the
aftermath of the first debate, when rumours began to circulate that Kenyatta would no
longer be participating in the second contest. With Kenyatta apparently angered by some
of the lines of questioning pursued by moderator Linus Kaikai during the section on the
ICC, a Jubilee Campaign press release described the debate as ‘skewed, shambolic and
farcical,’ and claimed that the candidate had decided his time was better spent returning
to ‘the campaign trail’.35 The CORD campaign quickly responded by accusing Kenyatta
of seeking to dodge questions on land which would be tabled in the second debate.36
Kenyatta ultimately chose to attend, but the exchanges around his potential no-show
represent the only real moment when campaigns sought visibly to politicise the issue of
attendance at the debates. The Jubilee campaign also seemed to secure their desired
outcome, with each and every candidate having their personal integrity probed during the
second debate.
The overriding stated objective of the media in pushing for the debates was to make a
positive contribution to the electoral process, by helping to inaugurate a new era of issue-
based politics. Journalists felt that ‘the whole country was watching them’, and talked of
a ‘responsibility to the public’ to move the country’s ‘political environment to the next
level’.37 In place of the usual political platitudes produced during campaign seasons,
candidates would be asked difficult questions on the issues journalists deemed to be of
most importance to ordinary Kenyans, and would be held to account for their answers.38
The extent to which the debates were successful in eliciting an issue-based discussion is,
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in the final analysis, questionable. Whilst candidates were asked questions and often
pushed for specific answers by the moderators, the discussion was often either repetitive
– with candidates parroting one another – or was rooted in personal accusations and
rebuttals. The section on corruption during the second debate saw the mud-slinging reach
a crescendo, with all candidates facing accusations of past improprieties.
At times the questions seemed out of touch with reality, particularly in the extended
discussion surrounding prospects for the introduction of a minimum wage, which had all
the candidates tying themselves in knots over the definitional difference between minimum
and living wages. It is also worth noting at this point that simply discussing issues does not
amount to issue-based politics. Whilst Odinga did at one point describe himself as a ‘social
democrat’, it was difficult over five hours of debate to discern real policy differences – let
alone ideological differences – between the candidates. Too often the go-to policy response
was simply to implement the constitution, whilst the standard answer to financial questions
was to cut government waste and clamp down on corruption. Taxation policy was
conspicuous by its absence from the discussion, something which with hindsight, given the
Jubilee government’s controversial changes to value added tax (VAT), might have been an
instructive discussion for some voters. Ultimately, post-debate analysis emphasised the
novelty of the events rather than the content; the fact that they ‘broke barriers’was accepted
much more readily than the possibility that they could have swayed voters.39
Images of peace
Whilst the extent to which the debates elicited from candidates ‘a concrete agenda,
complete with an implementation matrix’40 is questionable, the media were clearly
operating with multiple objectives in mind when staging them. Journalists admitted with
relative openness that, in holding the debates, they hoped to neutralise some of the latent
potential for electoral violence and dispel ‘the idea that this was a win or die or
election’.41 In pursuing this objective – which was clearly underpinned by certain
assumptions about who perpetrated the violence after the last election and why – as much
significance was attached to the spectacle and imagery of the debates as it was to the
questions posed to candidates. Key moments in the debates were scripted, staged and
choreographed to encourage cordial interactions between the candidates. Simple dramatic
devices were deployed to show the mutual respect shared by these members of the
political elite. For example, candidates were instructed that they had to shake hands with
one another upon entering the debate arena to give the universal sign of respect and fair
play.42 It was hoped that this staged show of mutual respect would work to dissuade
supporters from reacting violently in the event of disappointing results.43
Televised debates also provided the opportunity for the media to extract public
pledges from the candidates, which they could later be used to hold them to account.
Moderator Julie Gichuru made the most of this opportunity during a discussion on how
candidates intended to keep the upcoming polls peaceful. In a quick-fire round of
questions, Gichuru ensured that every candidate made an unequivocal promise not to
incite violence. She even went as far as to finish candidates’ answers for them, drumming
home the mantra ‘we don’t go to the street, we go to the courts’. This section concluded
with Gichuru thanking the candidates for their pledges. Whilst this exchange was aimed
at eliciting pledges of peace from the candidates to which they could later be held, the
spectacle was also constructed for audiences across the country, so as to alter their
outlook and behaviour. As the chairman of the steering committee, Wachira Waruru,
explains, the message to take from the debates is:
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that there is no need, first and foremost, to each kill other over politics. Indeed, one of the
most interesting things that happened in the first debate is actually not within the debate
itself, but what happened after the debate. Because all the candidates were joined on the stage
by their families. We had bitter rivals holding their grandchildren on the stage, showing off
their children to each other. And it was such a pleasant spectacle. … And the message was:
it’s never that serious. If these guys can stand in front of the whole country and show such
friendship, why should the rest of us fight over them?44
This section of the programme was deliberately staged to show voters that, at the end of
the day, politics is just a profession; that underneath public disputes lies genuine
friendship.45 To adopt Goffman’s terminology, this is, in a way, an attempt to make
visible the divisions between politicians’ front stage persona and back stage.46 Publicly,
in the ‘front stage’ they are competitors and political adversaries. When the show ends we
see the supposed ‘back stage’ scene: Kenyatta cooing over Karua’s grandchild whilst all
exchange pleasant greetings. Despite the first debate running over an hour beyond its
allotted timeframe, there was no quick cutaway at the end, with the cameras instead
lingering for a significant period on this staged show of elite friendship. It was a key
moment in the programme. The irony of course is that, in Kenyan politics, this elite unity
is in certain respects very real; the backstage is no more of a facade than the front stage.
By exposing this space of solidarity, the debates perhaps reaffirmed for audiences the
stability of the elite pact that had historically governed the country, but which broke down
in 2007/08 with devastating consequences.47
Staging democratic ‘maturity’
Beyond the understandable desire to take direct action which would work to prevent a
repeat of the events of 2007/08, memories of the violence pervaded media coverage of
the 2013 elections in a much broader sense. The events of the preceding election ‘left
deep scars in the public psyche’,48 one of which was the laying bare of the ‘cancer of
tribalism’, to use debate moderator Linus Kaikai’s words. This was the first area of
discussion in the first debate because, it was deemed ‘the single most serious problem in
the country’. By labelling tribalism in this way, the moderators conjured up a vision of
the dark place Kenya was coming from, and offered up – through aesthetic means – the
hope of a bright future, akin to other ‘mature’ democracies that hold presidential debates.
Newspaper opinion pieces pitted the style, content and conduct demanded of candidates
in a political debate against the unregulated mode that rallies precipitate. As one
commentator observed ‘in political rallies, they [politicians] are guided by populism, but
in a controlled live debate, they must justify the promises they have made’.49
In her study of public meetings, Angelique Haugerud demonstrates how such forums
have been used by the colonial and postcolonial state to control political debate. However,
since the reintroduction of multi-partyism, the state’s control over public debate has
diminished. Due in large part to the events of 2007/08, rallies have seemingly been
transformed in the public imagination into spaces of irresponsibility, where politicians,
largely removed from the glare of the media, are free to make empty promises and promote
divisive perspectives. The Waki Report, which investigated the post-election violence, laid
emphasis on hate-speech disseminated at rallies as a significant contributing factor to the
violence.50 Political rallies have come to be perceived as a ‘circus’,51 a ‘carnival’,52 and a
‘sideshow’,53 where ‘issues are politicised and personalities become the main subject of
discussion’.54 By contrast, debates were praised in the media as somehow un-African; a
‘rarity in this part of the world’, unlike in ‘old democracies’ such as America, where they
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are ‘long-established traditions’.55 By holding presidential debates Kenya was ‘moving
away from the easily excitable masses at a rally’ to an alternative political space governed
by markedly different standards and procedures.56
One commentator conveyed this sense of Kenya’s modernising democracy, when he
noted the contrast between Moi’s 1997 chat with John Sibi-Okumo and the presidential
debates. Mirroring the language of the Jubilee campaign, he claimed that: ‘we have come
from the analogue of monologue to the digital of debate and benched the old, tried and
tested mode of hurling insults (and stones) at each other before cheering mobs’.57 This
language of transition – from ‘tribalism’ to ‘maturity’ – has permeated public discourse in
Kenya over the past five years. Ghia Nodia explicates the relationship between ideas of
democracy and maturity, when he writes that:
The creation of a liberal democratic polity becomes a measure of political maturity. Failure
would signal a shameful ‘national disgrace’. Only sovereign states with stable, liberal
democratic governments are eligible to join the prestigious international club of ‘advanced’
or ‘modern’ nations.58
The emphasis on creation is important. The presidential debates were devised as an integral
process that would both signify and enable the maturing of Kenyan election campaigning.
They would force candidates to talk about issues and behave in a certain way. But
furthermore, by placing candidates on the debate floor, they were brought alongside their
international peers. This affinity between Kenya and other liberal democracies was
underscored by the plastering of red, blue and white on the programme’s visual effects, and
the stage itself, as opposed to the flag colours of red, green and black. This aesthetic
association built upon pre-debate coverage in the press that made frequent comparisons
between Kenya’s upcoming contests and American debates.59 This aspect of the spectacle
resonated strongly with regional audiences. One Ugandan commentator argued that ‘such a
debate would never take place in the Pearl of Africa’; that it symbolised a wider process of
democratisation, absent in Uganda.60 Similarly, a Tanzanian journalist voiced the hope that
politicians in his own country would take inspiration from developments in Kenya; that it
was ‘time Tanzania emulated such mature political debates’.61
The reason that international audiences were even able to engage with the debates
must not be overlooked. The decision to hold them in English rather than Kiswahili
reveals a great deal about the organisers’ priorities. Whilst both languages are spoken
widely and have official language status, the 2010 constitution designates Kiswahili alone
as the Republic’s national language.62 Yet the first debate took place entirely in English.
In the days after the programme aired, leading Kiswahili scholars complained that the use
of English was ‘biased’; that it excluded large swathes of the country’s population and in
the process denied them their constitutional rights.63 Noting that candidates tend to speak
in Kiswahili when addressing rallies, they went on to question exactly whom the debates
were targeting with their use of English.64 It is particularly interesting to note in this
regard that whilst the organisers provided no provision for simultaneous translation into
Kiswahili, there was a sign-language interpreter at the bottom of the screen.65
The scholars’ complaints received little coverage in the press, but journalists have since
admitted that the use of English was, with hindsight, a contentious decision. Whilst
recognising that many Kenyans would effectively be excluded from the debates, they felt
that English was simply the ‘obvious medium’ through which to discuss complex political
issues.66 For them, the ‘digital of debate’ required an internationally understood language.
The choice of English in part reflects deeply rooted linguistic power asymmetries in Kenya
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and Africa more broadly. Haugerud explores the phenomenon of code-switching at Kenyan
public meetings, noting that English has typically been accorded a higher status than
Kiswahili. Its use by politicians has often worked ‘to convey a message of superiority’ to
non-educated members of the audience.67 The extent to which these linguistic power
dynamics informed the decision-making of the debates’ organisers is unclear, but by having
candidates speak in English, the debates provided them with a means to stand alongside
Obama and Romney and meet increasingly normative, Western expectations of how one
must act on the campaign trail.
Exposing the spectacle
The debates were thus staged in part to promote peace and to exhibit Kenya’s maturing
democracy. There is something of a contradiction between these two motives in that
‘mature’ democracies from whom the Kenyan media took inspiration tend not to be
anxious about electoral violence. Similar tensions arose at times between the topics of
discussion and the formal, official style of the debates. For example, the section
discussing each candidates’ alleged past offences of corruption and impunity sits
uncomfortably within the normative tone of political debates where candidates are
ostensibly meant to attack one another on matters of policy, not private accumulation. The
extent to which this is ever truly the case is of course questionable, but it is important to
stress once again that this focus on policy rather than personality was a key stated aim of
the debates’ organisers. By incorporating questions on issues such as corruption and the
ICC process, which the candidates could answer, dodge and deflect, the debates – perhaps
inadvertently – worked to normalise them, and to defuse their potency as divisive
political issues. Following Gluckman, we thus see the debates as possessing some of the
qualities of a ‘ritual of rebellion’; events which function to lay bare social tensions and in
doing so work to heal these rifts without altering the structure of society.68 Examining
Gluckman’s work, Susan Schröter explains that ‘the final goal of these rituals was a social
blessing and the strengthening and renewing of the established order’.69 The emphasis is
on the performance of tension and the cathartic, stabilising effects of this. McLeod has
applied this concept to the presidential campaign season in America. Here, the ritual
socio-dramas of the campaign season allow potentially violent divisions within society to
be given voice within a structured and temporally bound arena, thus rendering them
surmountable. ‘American society is disarticulated metaphorically…and then rearticulated
every four years’, and through this cathartic exercise the broader status quo is preserved,
indeed strengthened.70
We find these concepts useful for understanding how questions about corruption,
economic inequality and the ICC worked to deactivate these controversial issues. It is not
suggested that the media consciously aimed to endorse such uncomfortable realities.
Rather, simply in exposing these rifts, the debates made them less divisive. Clearly, all
these topics have been discussed extensively in the Kenyan press innumerable times, both
before and since the debates. The key difference here is that the all the candidates were
put on the spot, in real time, with the nation watching. Having survived the questioning,
candidates were free to recommence their modus operandi.
The degree to which the organisers tried to control the tone and direction of debate is
perhaps most apparent when we turn to Mohamed Dida’s participation. Previously
unknown on the Kenyan political scene, Dida provided a series erratic contributions,
which were at times rambling and parabolic; at other moments direct and insightful. On
several occasions he exposed the limitations of the debate between candidates and the
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hollowness of the broader spectacle by interrupting stagnant discussions. During the
section on corruption he cut in to ask the moderator: ‘did you expect a thief to tell you
“I’ve stolen?”’. Similarly, when discussing economic inequality he stood alone by
rejecting the scales set by the salary commission, given its ‘sycophancy and nearness to
the palace’. Perhaps not especially eloquent, his repeated charge that ‘nobody is super
Kenyan’, resounded uncomfortably in the plushy private school-cum-television studio in
Lavington, a wealthy Nairobi suburb. In exposing the inadequacies of his fellow
candidates and their inability to talk objectively and honestly about these difficult issues,
Dida’s comments disordered the structured performance, and introduced an element of
uncertainty to the whole show. It is notable that many of his less comprehensible
contributions were met with visible embarrassment from the moderators. During the
discussion on healthcare, for instance, his suggestion that Kenyans should eat only when
they are hungry, and then should remember to leave room for water and ‘breathing
space’, was met with spontaneous laughter from elements of the audience, but left
Gichuru noticeably exasperated. Other bizarre answers were quickly sidestepped, with
moderators looking to move onto other candidates rather than interrogate him further.
These incidents exposed the spectacle at play, showing that the substantive content of
candidates’ exchanges was often of secondary importance to the tone and style of their
speech. The moderators expected and needed the candidates to comply with certain
normative debate roles; Dida’s failure to do so at times left them uncertain as to how to
proceed.
Analysis of an additional, much less widely publicised debate also exposes the
spectacle at play during the two presidential debates. On 14 February 2013, at Nairobi’s
All Saints Anglican Cathedral, the eight candidates’ running mates took part in a much
more low-key debate, which attracted a fraction of the domestic press coverage afforded
to their counterparts. Participants seemed noticeably more relaxed in this setting than
those at the top of the ticket did during their debates. The debate was organised by the
country’s churches in response to the planned presidential debates, which were seen as
overly commercialised and with no room for a discussion of values.71 A network of
churches facilitated the debate and it was distributed for free on Christian radio stations,
and broadcast live on KBC (the state-run network). Whilst the presidential debates dealt
with issues that were of concern to the journalists organising them, such as the economy
and security, the deputies debate dealt with issues which the churches claimed were
important to their members, such as abortion, sexuality and the school syllabus.72
According to one of the organisers, some of the questions were ‘very naughty from the
mainstream perspective – the questions on marriage and the permissibility of certain types
of relationship’.73 Some answers were equally ‘naughty’, with William Ruto claiming
that the Bible ‘equates homosexuals with a very derogated animal called dogs’. These
sorts of questions – and the answers they would elicit – were deliberately avoided in the
mainstream debates. Whilst aware of the strong links between religion and politics in
Kenya,74 the organisers of the presidential debates seemingly wished to avoid high-
lighting them. If the Kenyan debates were to stand alongside their international
counterparts, they had to project an image of a liberal democracy, where a genuine
separation of church and state tends to be expected.
Governance by spectacle
The organisers’ stated objective for the debates was to force candidates to outline their
proposed policies and defend their positions on various issues. The programmes probably
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succeeded in this regard, but is there any evidence that this exercise had an impact on the
election itself? A small poll conducted after the first debate, found that roughly only one-
quarter of those sampled considered the show to have changed their choice.75 Of these,
all candidates except Kenyatta and Kiyapi lost support, with these two gaining by 2.9%
and 0.1% respectively.76 Some have suggested that the reason Kenyatta exceed the 50%
of the vote threshold can in part be attributed to the disappointing displays by Kenneth
and Mudavadi during the debates, as many expected them to perform better.77 Such
assertions are impossible to quantify without further polling data or targeted research. But
beyond the direct influence of the debates on voter choice, we do see the programmes
working instrumentally to improve the image of Kenyan politics, but more specifically
Uhuru Kenyatta. Coached by a British public relations firm, Kenyatta came across not as
a tribal warlord but as a skilled and eloquent leader. Arguably, this transformation
of Kenyatta into a legitimate statesman might have some bearing on how ongoing
negotiations regarding the ICC play out.
Assessing what impacts, if any, the debates had is challenging when much of their
power lay in the programmes’ aesthetics rather than specific content. The widely
circulated image of all the candidates standing at podiums with a picture of State
House in the background was a tantalising representation of what politics in Kenya is,
or more importantly could, be. Writing of the Malawian context, Oyvind Eggen
explores how aesthetic imaginaries can be deployed by the state in substitution for
concrete realities. He describes the way images can reflect ‘ideas of a future form of
stateness’ which a country may crave to create.78 In staging the debates the way they
did, the media projected a particular vision of what form of political culture Kenya
should aspire to. To truly see this, it is useful to speculate on the alternative ways in
which the debates could have occurred. They could have taken place in a typical
government school, with a studio audience representative of the population, not the
political elite. The debates could have been held in Kiswahili, and only included
front-runners Odinga, Kenyatta and Mudavadi. The moderators could have really
pushed candidates for answers that went beyond just ‘the constitution says …’. If
any of these alternatives had taken place though, the spectacle would have been
undermined.
With the debates, the media assembled a constellation of images, actions and sound-
bites that came together to form a highly seductive aesthetic of democracy in Kenya.
Democracy was the debate floor, not the debate, and the discussion of issues was all that
was required to claim that issue-based politics is taking root in Kenya. Almost a form of
propaganda, an integral aim of the debates was to promote the nation itself, and – as
embodied by the programmes themselves – its rapidly evolving civic and political
culture. Indeed Gichuru wrapped up the first debate by concluding: ‘What we do all agree
on is this is a great nation’, and furthermore, that ‘Kenya is poised for incredible
growth.’79
Such use of spectacle forms part of a broader trend in Kenya, which sees intoxicating
images of the nation’s bright future produced, projected and circulated. In this way, the
country’s blueprint policy document Vision 2030, is blanketed with digitally mastered
photographs that claim to depict what the country will look like by the year 2030 if the
policy’s roadmap is followed. Pictures of magic-bullet solutions such as the Lamu Port-
Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor are used to substantiate
promises of imminent and rapid growth.80 Quick to recognise the power of these visual
devices, Kenyatta and Ruto have capitalised on the opportunities offered by social media
for sharing such images. On a number of occasions since taking office the duo have
88 N. Moss and A. O’Hare
tweeted photographs of them at the airport together, with Ruto either waving the president
away as he departs on an overseas trip, or welcoming him back. The images essentially
constitute a highly visible performance of the constitution; the symbolic temporary
handover of executive power from president to deputy. With both men facing trials at the
Hague, the images implicitly work to assuage any doubts over the nation’s leadership and
the solidity of the constitutional order whilst either is out of the country.
We see the debates as part of this trend towards governance by spectacle; a project
performed by multiple parties who have a stake in the nation. They were to project a
vision of the direction in which Kenyan democracy is moving whilst simultaneously
bringing that goalpost closer in the very staging of the events. The decision of the Kenyan
media to devote considerable resources to these spectacles raises interesting questions
concerning the role they staked for themselves in the electoral process. It is clear from the
presidential debates that the Kenyan media saw its role as extending well beyond just
informing voters and acting as a watchdog. Instead, they felt a responsibility to contribute
more directly to the democratic process; to take action to secure a peaceful outcome, and
beyond this, to promote the nation itself.81 In doing so, we suggest that they partially
abdicated their normative responsibility to interrogate the visions of the country’s future
being offered by the campaigns, and instead became complicit in the construction of a
governance spectacle. Such close cooperation perhaps compromised the media’s ability to
hold politicians and institutions to account. Questions around these issues extend well
beyond the scope of this article. Yet in offering this analysis, we hope to have shown that
Kenya’s so called ‘peaceocracy’ played out as much in the constructed realm of spectacle
as it did in the more tangible decisions about what to report and when.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank Professor Ambreena Manji and Professor John Harrington for their
encouragement and advice throughout the preparation of this article. In addition, the authors are
grateful to Gabrielle Lynch, Nic Cheeseman, Justin Willis and Karuti Kanyinga for organising the
elections workshop in Nairobi, and for providing a forum in which to hone their ideas. The authors
also would like to acknowledge the anonymous reviewers, whose valuable comments were
welcomingly received. Finally, they thank all the interviewees for sparing the time to talk frankly
and openly with them. All views expressed are the authors’ own.
Notes
1. Interview with an RMS journalist, RM Communication Centre, Nairobi, May 22, 2013.
2. Ni Chonghaile, “Kenya Hosts First Televised Presidential Debate.”
3. Mundi, “All set for Kenya’s Presidential Debate.”
4. Ipsos Public Affairs, Political Barometer Survey, pp. 6, 10.
5. Howard, Media & Elections, p. 2.
6. Frère, Elections and the Media, p. 13.
7. Somerville, “Violence, Hate Speech and Inflammatory Broadcasting,” p. 89.
8. Orengo, “Police Most Corrupt.”
9. Ibid., p. 90.
10. Interview with an RMS journalist, RMS Communication Centre, Nairobi, May 22, 2013.
11. Brisset-Foucault, “Electoral Campaign on Television.”
12. Wrong, “To Be Prudent.”
13. Allen, “Kenya’s Journalists Start to Break.”
14. Kittony, “Role of the Media.”
15. For example, Daily Nation, “Presidential Debates Will be Good for Kenya.”
16. Githongo, “Rethinking the Kenya Project.”
17. Ni Chonghaile, “Kenya Hosts First Televised Presidential Debate.”
18. Interview with Nation Media journalist 1, Nation Media Centre, May 15, 2013.
Journal of Eastern African Studies 89
19. Kellner, “Media Spectacle and Media Events,” p. 76.
20. Interview with an RMS journalist, RMS Communication Centre, Nairobi, May 22, 2013;
Sugow, “How the Presidential Debate will be Conducted.”
21. For example, Agha, “Tropic Aggression.”
22. For example, Watson, “Theatre and the Presidential Debates.”
23. For more information, see Ipsos Public Affairs, Political Barometer Survey.
24. Kipkemboi, “Presidential Debates Can be Game-Changer.”
25. Howard, “International Media Assistance.”
26. A Kenyan NGO focusing on media development.
27. Brisset-Foucault, “Electoral Campaign on Television,” p. 115.
28. Interview with an RMS journalist, RMS Communication Centre, Nairobi, May 22, 2013.
29. Interview with Nation Media journalist 2, Nation Centre Nairobi, 15 May 2013.
30. Daily Nation, “Presidential Hopefuls to Slug it Out.” The first debate was originally scheduled
to take place on 26 November 2012, but was postponed until the final electoral alliances had
been decided.
31. Telephone interview with Simon Waddington, May 20, 2013.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid.
34. Matata, “Muite and Dida to Participate.”
35. Leftie, “CORD and Jubilee in Blame Game.”
36. Ibid.
37. Interview with an RMS journalist, RMS Communication Centre, Nairobi, May 22, 2013.
38. Interview with Nation Media journalist 1, Nation Media Centre, 15 May 2013.
39. Mwiti, “Winners and Losers.”
40. Daily Nation, “Presidential Debates Will Be Good For Kenya.”
41. Interview with Nation Media journalist 1, Nation Media Centre, 15 May 2013.
42. Interview with an RMS journalist, RMS Communication Centre, Nairobi, May 22, 2013.
43. Kipkemboi, “Presidential Debates Can be Game-Changer.”
44. Clottey, “Kenya to Hold Final Presidential Debate.”
45. Interview with an RMS journalist, RMS Communication Centre, Nairobi, May 22, 2013.
46. Goffman, Presentation of Self.
47. Branch and Cheeseman, “Conclusion: Failure of Nation-Building,” p. 244.
48. Kagwanja and Southall, “Introduction: Kenya – A Democracy in Retreat?,” p. 275.
49. The Standard, “Editorial: Today’s Presidential Debate.”
50. Waki Commission, Report of the Commission of Inquiry, pp. 216–17.
51. Makona, “Most Political Rallies.”
52. Ibid.
53. Ndonga, “Kenyans Hail the Presidential Debate.”
54. Lwabukuna, “Kenya’s First Presidential Election Debate.”
55. Daily Nation, “Presidential Debates Will be Good for Kenya.”
56. Kipkemboi, “Presidential Debates Can be Game-Changer.”
57. The Standard, “Crazy Questions for 2013 Presidential Debate.”
58. Nodia, “Nationalism and Democracy,” p. 16.
59. For example, Zilper, “Lessons Kenya Can Learn.”
60. Onyango-Obbo, “Why Kenya Has Presidential Debates.”
61. Machira, “Local Politicians Inspired.”
62. Article 7 (1).
63. Rajab, “Scholars Call for Use of Kiswahili.” The poll conducted by IPSOS Synovate also noted
‘a large proportion of the audience’ had been excluded by the decision to hold the debates in
English.
64. Ibid.
65. In response to the complaints the second debate contained a brief section in Kiswahili,
moderated by Joe Ageyo, but again there was no on-screen translation service provided for the
rest of event.
66. Interview with Daily Nation journalist 2, Nation Centre, Nairobi, May 15, 2013.
67. Haugerud, Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya, p. 63.
68. Gluckman, Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa.
69. Schröter, “Rituals of Rebellion”, p. 44.
90 N. Moss and A. O’Hare
70. McLeod, “Sociodrama of Presidential Politics,” p. 360.
71. Interview with Professor Levi Obonyo, Daystar University Nairobi, May 14, 2013.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. The day before the second debate, for instance, the presidential candidates attended a ‘national
day of repentance and prayers’ at Uhuru Park, which was presided over by the self-styled
Prophet David Uwuor.
75. Ipsos Public Affairs, Political Barometer Survey, pp. 6, 33–4.
76. Ibid.
77. Telephone interview with Simon Waddington, May 20, 2013.
78. Eggen, “Performing Good Governance,” p. 2.
79. Fortin, “Kenya Seeks Progress.”
80. See the Vision 2030 website: http://www.vision2030.go.ke/.
81. Brisset-Foucault’s analysis of the media’s actions in 2007 is also instructive here; Brisset-
Foucault, “Electoral Campaign on Television.”
References
Agha Asif. “Tropic Aggression in the Clinton–Dole Presidential Debate.” Pragmatics 7 (1997):
461–498.
Allen, Karen. “Kenya’s Journalists Start to Break Their Election Silence.” Mail & Guardian, March
22, 2013.
Branch, Daniel, and Nic Cheeseman. “Conclusion: The Failure of Nation-Building and the Kenya
Crisis.” In Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya Since 1950, edited by Daniel Branch, Nic
Cheeseman, and Leigh Gardner, 244–256. Berlin: Lit, 2010.
Brisset-Foucault, Florence. “The Electoral Campaign on Television. Communication Strategies and
Models of Democracy.” In The General Elections in Kenya 2007, edited by J. Lafargue,
109–149. Nairobi: Institut Français de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA), 2009.
Clottey, Peter. “Kenya to Hold Final Presidential Debate Monday.” Voice of America February
24, 2013.
Daily Nation. “Editorial: Presidential Debates Will be Good for Kenya.” Daily Nation October
11, 2012.
Daily Nation. “Editorial: Presidential Hopefuls to Slug it Out in TV Debates.” Daily Nation October
10, 2013.
Eggen, Oyvind. “Performing Good Governance: The Aesthetics of Bureaucratic Practice in
Malawi.” Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology 77, no. 1 (2012): 1–23.
Fortin, Jacey, “Kenya Seeks Progress, Dreads Violence as Presidential Election Nears.” Interna-
tional Business Times February 13, 2013.
Frère, Marie-Soleil. Elections and the Media in Post-Conflict Africa: Votes and Voices for Peace?
London: Zed, 2011.
Githongo, John. “Rethinking the Kenya Project.” The Star March 27, 2013.
Gluckman, Max. Rituals of Rebellion in South-East Africa. Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1954.
Goffman, Erving. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York, NY: Anchor, 1959.
Haugerud, Angelique. The Culture of Politics in Modern Kenya. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993.
Howard, Ross. Media & Elections: An Election Reporting Handbook. Vancouver, BC: IMPACS, 2004.
Howard, Ross. International Media Assistance: A Review of Donor Activities and Lessons Learned.
Amsterdam: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, Conflict Research Unit, 2003.
Ipsos Public Affairs, Political Barometer Survey: Post-Presidential Debate Poll. February 13, 2013.
Kagwanja, Peter, and Roger Southall. “Introduction: Kenya – A Democracy in Retreat?” Journal of
Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 3 (2009): 259–277.
Kellner, Douglas. “Media Spectacle and Media Events: Some Critical Reflections.” In Media
Events in a Global Age, edited by Nick Couldru, Andreas Hepp, and Friedrich Kotz, 76–91.
Oxford: Routledge, 2010.
Kipkemboi, Andrew. “Presidential Debates Can be Game-Changer, The Standard February
11, 2013.
Kittony, Kiprono. “The Role of the Media in Kenya’s 2013 Election.” The Star May 8, 2013.
Journal of Eastern African Studies 91
Leftie, Peter. “CORD and Jubilee in Blame Game as Uhuru Skips Debate.” Daily Nation February
20, 2013.
Lwabukuna, Olivia Kokushubila. “Kenya’s First Presidential Election Debate: Tackling the ICC,
Party Politics, Tribalism and Corruption.” Polity.org.za February 13, 2013.
Machira, Polycarp. “Local Politicians Inspired by Kenya Presidential Debates.” The Citizen
February 27, 2013.
Makona, Trevor. “Most Political Rallies are Circuses for Idlers.” The Standard January 2, 2013.
Matata, Lydia. “Muite and Dida to Participate in Presidential Debate.” The Star February 11, 2013.
McLeod, James. “The Sociodrama of Presidential Politics: Rhetoric, Ritual, and Power in the Era of
Teledemocracy.” American Anthropologist 101, no. 2 (1999): 359–373.
Mundi, Benjamin. “All Set for Kenya’s Presidential Debate.” Daily Nation February 7, 2013.
Mwiti, Lee. “The Winners and Losers of Kenya’s First Ever Presidential Debate.” Africa Review
February 12, 2013.
Ndonga, Wambui, “Kenyans Hail the Presidential Debate.” Capital News February 12, 2013.
Ni Chonghaile, Clar. “Kenya Hosts First Televised Presidential Debate.” The Guardian February
12, 2013.
Nodia, Ghia. “Nationalism and Democracy.” Journal of Democracy 3, no. 4 (1992): 3–22.
Onyango-Obbo, Charles. “Why Kenya has Presidential Debates but in Uganda Museveni Won’t
Show.” Daily Monitor February 27, 2013.
Orengo, Peter. “Police Most Corrupt, Media Most Trusted – Poll.” The Standard March 6, 2012.
Rajab, Ramadhan. “Scholars Call for Use of Kiswahili in Next Presidential Debate.” The Star
February 20, 2013.
Schröter, Susan. “Rituals of Rebellion – Rebellion as Ritual: A Theory Reconsidered.” In The
Dynamics of Changing Rituals: The Transformation of Religious Rituals Within Their Social and
Cultural Context, edited by Jens Kreinath, Constance Hartung, and Annette Deschner, 41–57.
New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2004.
Somerville, Keith. “Violence, Hate Speech and Inflammatory Broadcasting in Kenya: The Problems
of Definition and Identification.” Ecquid Novi: African Journalism Studies 32, no. 1 (2011):
82–101.
Sugow, Abdikadir. “How the Presidential Debate Will be Conducted.” The Standard February
10, 2013.
The Standard. “Crazy Questions for 2013 Presidential Debate.” The Standard February 11, 2013.
The Standard. “Editorial: Today’s Presidential Debate a Must-Watch for All Voters.” The Standard
February 11, 2013.
Waki Commission. Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence. Nairobi: Waki
Commission, 2008.
Watson, Ian. “Theatre and the Presidential Debates: The Role of Performance in Voter Choice.”
New Theatre Quarterly 22, no. 4 (2006): 336–351.
Wrong, Michela. “To Be Prudent Is to Be Partial.” International Herald Tribune March 14, 2013.
Zilper, Audi. “Lessons Kenya Can Learn from the US Presidential Debate.” The Standard October
17, 2012.
92 N. Moss and A. O’Hare
